Philosophy And Psychoanalysis

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I have happily accepted your invitation to speak on the relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy because it is a subject that often came up in my mind, occupied me for a while, and then the urgency passed and other issues replaced it, and I was never forced to make a definitive statement. Only after I finished the first draft of this lecture did it dawn on me that the title might have a deeper personal meaning for me. My father was a professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and I have devoted my professional life to psychoanalysis. It is therefore possible that this paper, written in my old age, represents a bridge back to my father.

Let me lay before you some of the difficulties of the subject. If you think about certain books by Freud, like The Future of An Illusion (1927), in which Freud discussed the problem of religion, or his profound Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), you can have little doubt that they were written by a man who would generally be considered a significant philosopher. However, at the same time, if you inquire what Freud's attitude towards philosophy was, you soon would conclude that it was a critical, negative one. It so happened that in 1931 a psychoanalyst named Fritz Wittels wrote the first biography of Freud. The book, Freud and His Time, is now forgotten, but I still remember that Wittels' second chapter was titled "Freud, the Anti-philosopher."

In New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, published in 1933, six years before his death, Freud devoted the last chapter to what he called Weltschauung. The word is German and Freud rightly claimed that it is not easily translatable. He defined it as

an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place. It will easily be understood that the possession of a Weltschauung of this kind is among the ideal wishes of

human beings. Believing in it, one can feel secure in life, one can know what to strive for, and how one can deal most expedi
diently with one's emotions and interests (p. 158).

Freud concluded that psychoanalysis does not have a Weltanschauung of its own and shares that of science in general. At this point Freud ran into a difficulty because he realized that science cannot claim to be a Weltanschauung either. In the same essay Freud criticized philosophy because it clings to the illusion of being able to present a picture of the universe without gaps (p. 160). Freud ended by advocating the “dictatorship of reason” as the best hope for the future of the intellect. Without such a dictatorship of reason, Freud feared we could end up with everyone having her own multiplication table or his own personal units of length and weights (p. 171).

While Freud disclaimed that psychoanalysis had a Weltanschauung of its own, he accused other psychoanalysts of trying to create one.

Many writers have laid much stress on the weakness of the ego in relation to the id and of our rational elements in the face of the daemonic forces within us; and they display a strong tendency to make what I have said into a corner-stone of a psycho-analytic Weltanschauung (1925, p. 95).

In the same book Freud suggested that Weltanschauungen (the plural form of the word) should be left to philosophers.

Such activities may be left to philosophers, who avowedly find it impossible to make their journey through life without a Baedeker of that kind to give them information on every subject. Let us humbly accept the contempt with which they look down on us from the vantage-ground of their superior needs (p. 96).

Baedeker was the famous German tour guide of the time but the alleged contempt of the philosopher towards the psychoanalyst was Freud’s projection. It was Freud, rather, who had contempt for philosophers. Freud did not specify who these philosophers were but anyone acquainted with the history of philosophy [and I will make use of Bertrand Russell's A History of Western Philosophy (1945)] will have to concede that Freud offered a caricature rather than a history of philosophy. With remarks such as these, Freud discouraged all attempts to see psychoanalysis as a philosophy of life. At the same time and in a different context he was also afraid that psychoanalysis would become only a branch of medicine.
Psycho-analysis is not a specialized branch of medicine.

... Psycho-analysis is a part of psychology; not of medical psychology in the old sense, not of the psychology of morbid processes, but simply of psychology. It is certainly not the whole of psychology, but its substructure and perhaps even its entire foundation (1926, p. 252).

We do not know exactly why Freud turned against philosophy and why he became so afraid that his psychoanalysis would take its place as another type of philosophy. However, he definitely wanted psychoanalysis to be part of the natural sciences and not a philosophy of life.

Gerald Edelman, in his by now famous book, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire* (1992), discussed the relationship between science and philosophy in an essentially similar way but with a radically different attitude.

To a scientist, philosophy can be a disconcerting business. Science is supposed to provide a description of the laws of that world and of how they may be applied. Philosophy by contrast, has no proper subject matter of its own. Instead, it scrutinizes other areas of knowledge for clarity and consistency. Furthermore, unlike science, it may be called immodest. There is no partial philosophy; it is complete with each philosopher . . . the philosopher must not simply describe an environment but construct a whole world. Each time a philosophical construction is attempted, there is a worldview behind it, and a personal one at that (p. 158).

The outlooks of Freud and Edelman are strikingly similar but Freud has contempt for what philosophy attempts to do, and Edelman sees philosophy as one of the interesting achievements of the human spirit.

Bertrand Russell, in *A History of Western Philosophy*, wrote:

Philosophy, as I shall understand the word, is something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology, it consists of speculations on matters as to which definite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority . . . Almost all the questions of most interest to speculative minds are such as science cannot answer . . . Has the universe any unity or purpose? Is it evolving towards some goal? Are there really laws of nature, or do we believe in them only because
of our innate love of order? Is man what he seems to the astronomer, a tiny lump of impure carbon and water impotently crawling on a small and unimportant planet? Or is he what he appears to Hamlet?" (p. xiii).

In the 1927 postscript to his book, The Question of Lay Analysis, Freud reiterated:

After forty-one years of medical activity, my self-knowledge tells me that I have never really been a doctor in the proper sense. I became a doctor through being compelled to deviate from my original purpose; and the triumph of my life lies in my having, after a long and roundabout journey, found my way back to my earliest path. I have no knowledge of having had any craving in my early childhood to help suffering humanity . . . Nor did I ever play the “doctor game.” . . . In my youth I felt an overpowering need to understand something of the riddles of the world in which we live and perhaps even to contribute something to their solution (p. 253).

In the postscript to his Autobiographical Study (1925), Freud spoke in more personal terms. “My interest, after making a lifelong detour through the natural sciences, medicine and psychotherapy, returned to the cultural problem which had fascinated me long before, when I was a youth scarcely old enough for thinking” (p. 72). Freud then acknowledged that in 1929 “Thomas Mann, one of the acknowledged spokesmen of the German people, found a place for me in the history of modern thought” (p. 72).

Thomas Mann sought to place Freud within a stream of Western thought. Because Freud was interested in the psychology of instinct, “the night side of nature,” and the primacy of the unconscious, he stands in opposition to nationalism, intellectualism, and classicism. Like Schopenhauer, Freud “humbles the intellect far below the will,” says Mann (1933). Only towards the end of the essay does he draw a line between Romanticism and psychoanalysis.

Freud's interest as a scientist in the affective does not degenerate into a glorification of its object at the expense of the intellectual sphere. His anti-rationalism consists in seeing the actual superiority of the impulse over the mind, power for power; not at all in lying down and groveling before that superiority, or in contempt for mind (p. 193).
Mann then quotes Freud's famous paragraph:

“We may,” says Freud, “emphasize as often as we like the fact that intellect is powerless compared with impulse in human life — we shall be right. But after all there is something peculiar about this weakness, the voice of the intellect is low, but it rests not till it gets a hearing. In the end, after countless repulses, it gets one after all” (p. 194).

Mann goes on to discuss Freud's death instinct theory and notes that it was anticipated by Novalis (1772-1801), a German poet and Romantic writer. Mann's effort to place Freud both inside and outside of Romanticism was succinctly expressed by Fenichel, who wrote, “The subject matter of psychoanalysis is the irrational, the method of investigation is rational” (p. 4).

When Fenichel's book appeared in 1945, I was still in the army, in the psychiatric service. This statement by Fenichel was an eye-opener, enabling me to place psychoanalysis within the intellectual stream of Western culture. The great philosophical divide in European thinking was between those who followed the philosophy of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the supremacy of reason, and the Romantic philosophers, who were more impressed by the irrational forces that govern human destiny. Before Freud the interest in dreams belonged to the Romantic realm, but Freud's Interpretation of Dreams (1900), with the emphasis on the word interpretation, won the dream over to the rationalism of the Enlightenment.

If we were to single out a philosopher who had the greatest influence on Freud, Nietzsche would likely be the one. In On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement (1914), Freud had this to say about him:

I have denied myself the very great pleasure of reading the works of Nietzsche, with the deliberate object of not being hampered in working out the impressions received in psychoanalysis by any sort of anticipatory ideas. I had therefore to be prepared — and I am so, gladly — to forgo all claims to priority in the many instances in which laborious psychoanalytic investigation can merely confirm the truths which the philosopher recognized by intuition (pp. 15-16).

This is indeed a very strange statement to make. Knowledge of Nietzsche could not have been avoided in the circles in which Freud moved even if he decided not to read him. Freud was an avid reader; why did he not fear the “anticipatory ideas” in other writers and thinkers? I conclude that Freud
knew very well how much he owed Nietzsche but could not acknowledge it. Even the so-called differences between the philosopher's intuition and the supposed "laborious psycho-analytic investigations" is, to my mind, false. Most of Freud's great discoveries were not laborious investigations but flashes of insight, not fundamentally different from those Nietzsche had. Even now original analytic insights are not the result of hard work but flashes of intuition based, to be sure, on previously acquired psychoanalytic knowledge. In Freud's defense, however, we can say that to admit that psychoanalysis was indebted to Nietzsche would not have been easy. It was easier to admit his debt to Sophocles and Shakespeare than to Nietzsche as they were further in the past and because Freud's claim was to be a natural scientist who had to work hard and not rely on intuition. The question of the relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy boils down to whether we seek the ancestry of psychoanalysis in natural science or philosophy.

The psychoanalytic term, sublimation, offers a good example of the relationship. It was used in its Latin form, sublimare, by medieval alchemists to mean "to purify." (In physics today, it means going from solid to gas without going through a liquid state. Ed.) The term was taken into philosophy by Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Novalis but it was Nietzsche alone who spoke of sublimated sexuality (Kaufman, 1950, p. 190) and believed that sexual impulses could be sublimated into creative activity.

After Freud introduced the concept of the death instinct in 1920, the concept of the repetition compulsion became increasingly important in psychoanalytic treatment: first, to discover in each case the silent working of the repetition compulsion, then to trace it back to past traumatic events, and eventually help the patient overcome its power. This became an important part of our work. The concept of repetition compulsion was anticipated by Nietzsche's "eternal return." Nietzsche wrote a book, Beyond Good and Evil, while Freud wrote Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).

As personalities, Freud and Nietzsche could not have been further apart. Nietzsche's father, like Jung's father, was a Protestant pastor. Nietzsche for a time was an admirer of Wagner and his music. As Russell put it: "Nietzsche's superman is very like Siegfried, except that he knows Greek" (p. 760). Nietzsche admired ruthlessness, war, and aristocratic pride, while Freud was a liberal. Nietzsche was not definitely anti-Semitic but he felt that Germany already had as many Jews as it could assimilate.

In a letter to his friend Wilhelm Fliess on February 1, 1900, written 14 years before the quotation about not reading Nietzsche, cited earlier, Freud wrote: "I have just acquired Nietzsche, in whom I hope to find words for
much that remains mute in me, but have not opened him yet" (Masson, 1985, p. 398). These lines were written after The Interpretation of Dreams was complete, and there is no indication here of any fear of “anticipatory ideas.”

On January 1, 1896, Freud wrote to Fliess:

“I see how, via the detour of medical practice, you are reaching your first ideal of understanding human beings as a physiologist, just as I must secretly nourish the hope of arriving, via these same paths, at my initial goal of philosophy. For that is what I wanted originally, when it was not yet at all clear to me to what end I was in the world.” (Ibid. p. 159).

Freud could hardly have been clearer: his “initial goal” was philosophy. Seen psychoanalytically, Freud’s statement is one where his narcissism is pronounced, as in “to what end I was in the world,” which is spoken like a prophet. Freud does not speak like a Darwinian. He is sure he is in the world for some purpose but that finding it requires much work.

In another letter to Fliess, written on April 2, 1896, Freud wrote:

“As a young man I knew no longing other than for philosophical knowledge, and now I am about to fulfill it as I move from medicine to psychology. I became a therapist against my will.” . . . (Ibid. p. 180).

In 1896 Freud was still more than a year away from discovering the Oedipus complex but the transition from medicine to psychology represented to him a return to philosophy.

In his later life Freud turned bitterly against philosophy, but these quotes leave us in no doubt that in the years before he formulated the principles of psychoanalysis he considered his journey to psychology as a return to his earlier interest in philosophy. So we can go back to these remarks and ask whether psychoanalysis is only a form of therapy or a therapy that is based ultimately on a philosophy of life.

The next stop in the journey I am describing brings us to the Freud-Jung letters (McGuire, 1974) and more particularly to Jung’s letter 178, dated February 11, 1910. Jung tells Freud:

At present I am sitting so precariously on the fence between the Dionysian and the Apollonian that I wonder whether it might not be worthwhile to reintroduce a few of the older cultural stupidities such as the monasteries. . . . The ethical
problem of sexual freedom really is enormous and worth the sweat of all noble souls. But 2000 years of Christianity can only be replaced by something equivalent. . . . I think we must give it time to infiltrate into people from many centres, to revivify among intellectuals a feeling for symbol and myth, ever so gently to transform Christ back into the soothsaying god of the vine. . . . (McGuire, pp. 293-94).

The terms Apollonian and Dionysian were taken from Nietzsche's book, The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music (1993): Apollo stood for moderation and rationality while Dionysus, the god of wine, stood for abandonment of the rational world in intoxication.

Only two days later, Freud responded soberly to this enthusiastic and even manic letter:

But you mustn't regard me as the founder of a religion. My intentions are not so far-reaching . . . I am not thinking of a substitute for religion; this need must be sublimated. I did not expect the Fraternity to become a religious organization any more than I would expect a volunteer fire department to do so! (McGuire, p. 295).

Freud's remark is witty and clever but one cannot say that he empathized with or even understood Jung's search for such a fraternity. One can go further and question whether he is using the term sublimation correctly; after all, the very wish for such a fraternity is already a sublimation. Should a sublimation be further sublimated?

At the time these letters were exchanged, Freud was grooming Jung to be his successor as the president of the Psychoanalytic International, just about to be founded. Freud identified himself with Moses, who never reached the Promised Land, and saw Jung as his Joshua, who would lead psychoanalysis from the current desert to the Promised Land. He was convinced that Jung, who was on the faculty of the prestigious medical department of the University of Zurich and who was a gentile, would succeed where he, the marginal Jew, could not prevail.

The philosophical basis of Jungian therapy is similar to that of Freudian therapy. Jungian therapy aims to help modern alienated and ruthless men and women find their way back to their ancestral world. It says, in fact, that at our core we are where we come from and we should return there. By contrast, Freudian psychoanalysis, while not rooted in a definite philosophy, evolved from every individual's intrapsychic conflict. It believes that the therapist
can create an alliance with the patient’s besieged ego to help it become stronger, less at the mercy of either the id or the superego. This stronger ego should then be able to obtain relief from what has not been mastered during childhood, and by a better mastery of the Oedipus complex, make sexuality freer, more intense, and more satisfying. In my view the very act of setting such goals is what makes psychoanalysis also a philosophy. It is the philosophy that emerged after the full awareness of the power of the unconscious was discovered. Psychoanalysis, as a special kind of therapy, is the philosophy that emphasizes the role of the repressed unconscious in its considerations.

But if we are interested in the relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy, the encounter between Freud and Jung and the parting of their ways is of special interest. Earlier I quoted Fenichel saying that the subject matter of psychoanalysis is the irrational but the methods of psychoanalysis are rational. This is not true for Jung and his philosophy. Jung is an example of the irrational gaining the upper hand and trying to conquer the field of psychotherapy. Jung is the creator of a Romantic psychotherapy.

Today, because Hitler’s National Socialism has been defeated, we can look back at Jung’s Romantic therapy and the Romantic philosophy upon which it is based with interest rather than indignation. It is a fascinating subject in its own right but it would take me too far from my subject. Two short quotations will have to suffice. In 1934 Jung said:

The Jew, who is something of a nomad, has never yet created a cultural form of his own and as far as we can see never will, since all his instincts and talents require a more or less civilized nation to act as host for their development . . . The “Aryan” unconscious has a higher potential than the Jewish; that is both the advantage and the disadvantage of a youthfulness not yet fully weaned from barbarism. In my opinion it has been a grave error in medical psychology up to now to apply Jewish categories – which are not even binding on all Jews – indiscriminately to German and Slavic Christendom. Because of this the most precious secret of the Germanic peoples – their creative and intuitive depth of soul – has been explained as a mass of banal infantilism, while my own warning voice has for decades been suspected of anti-Semitism. This suspicion emanated from Freud. He did not understand the Germanic psyche any more than did his Germanic followers. Has the formidable phenomenon of National Socialism, on which the whole world gazes with astonished eyes, taught them better? (Maidenbaum & Martin, p. 217).
The second quote is from Jung's 1935 lecture at the Tavistock Clinic in London.

Who would have thought in 1900 that it would be possible thirty years later for such things to happen in Germany as are happening today? Would you have believed that a whole nation of highly intelligent and cultivated people could be seized by the fascinating power of an archetype? I saw it coming, and I can understand it because I know the power of the collective unconscious. But on the surface it looks simply incredible. Even my personal friends are under that fascination, and when I am in Germany, I believe it myself, I understand it all, I know it has to be as it is. One cannot resist it. It gets you below the belt and not in your mind, your brain just counts for nothing, your sympathetic system is gripped. It is a power that fascinates people from within, it is the collective unconscious which is activated, it is an archetype which is common to them all that has come to life (Ibid. p. 377).

The claim that Jews have "never yet created a cultural form" of their own ignores the creation of monotheism and the Bible and is obviously absurd, but the whole differentiation between Aryan and Jewish unconscious as different and incompatible belongs to the world of Romanticism. It is also striking how this Romantic enthusiasm enabled Jung to embrace National Socialism. As to these cultural and philosophical differences between Jung and Freud, from Winnicott's 1964 review of Jung's book, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, we now understand that Jung had a childhood psychosis that Freud did not know about. Even if he had known he would not have known how to respond to Jung.

Pursuing the relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy further, we come to the fundamental change in Freud's thinking between 1920 and 1923. It is well-known that Freud changed his mind fundamentally twice in his life, once between 1885 and 1900, when he discarded his seduction theory as the cause of hysteria in favor of the discovery of the Oedipus complex and infantile sexuality, but this change did not require a change in Freud's philosophy.
The contrast between the topographic and the structural point of view

The situation was very different when the next important change took place in Freud between 1920 and 1923. The transition from the topographic to the structural point of view took place in two books, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), where the death instinct was introduced, and The Ego and the Id (1923), where the new tripartite division of the psychic apparatus was formulated. It was in the former that Freud introduced an idea of the death instinct that in my opinion represented a major philosophical reorientation in the philosophy of psychoanalysis. The reasons that Freud gave for this major change in his thinking were not philosophical but clinical. However, that does not mean that the change did not imply a major philosophical change. In the United States the change is described as shifting from the topographic to the structural point of view, while in Europe it is called a change from the first topographic to the second topographic model.

When these later changes were introduced in the 1920s there was already an organized psychoanalytic movement and its adherents were won over to psychoanalysis by the topographic point of view. It appears that psychoanalytic pioneers were entirely satisfied by the topographic point of view but were now confronted with the fact that the creator of this paradigm demanded a radical revision. It is hardly surprising that they reacted with bewilderment.

The task a psychoanalyst must perform under the topographic model was, in my opinion, much simpler and it was correspondingly more pleasurable to be a psychoanalyst. The enemy was repression, directed particularly against the wishes of the Oedipus complex, and while the repression was necessary during childhood, Freud thought its task could be taken over by the now more mature ego, without the need to repress. Undoing the impact of repression became the therapeutic task. There are forces within the analysand that the therapist counts upon for assistance: the dynamic unconscious is pushing upward in dreams and slips of the tongue. Free association helps make the unconscious conscious; spontaneous childhood memories emerge and transference manifestations make the past reappear in the present. Once the unconscious was made conscious, the topographic psychoanalyst could trust the ego of the analysand to do the rest. Relatively small help over a relatively short period of time was all that was necessary. Termination was clear-cut when the most important repressed wishes of childhood, particularly the specific Oedipality of the patient, had been made conscious.

Under the structural model everything was more difficult, victory much less certain, and the demand on the psychoanalyst much heavier. Repression
was no longer the main enemy; it was seen as just one of the many defenses of the ego and a relatively privileged defense, easier to deal with than denial, projection, or reaction formation, because it interfered less with the capacity of the ego to test reality. The widening scope of psychoanalysis led to the unwelcome discovery that too many patients use these defenses, other than repression, which are less susceptible to modification by techniques employed by psychoanalysis.

I assume that the twin discoveries of the death instinct and the power of the repetition compulsion may have been traumatic for Freud, and that the turning away from clinical psychoanalysis to a broader interest in the future of civilization became urgent for him. He was no longer sure that human civilization would survive; the therapeutic efforts of psychoanalysis seemed small compared to the danger the power of the aggressive drive posed. It is even more daring on my part to assume that unconsciously the psychoanalytic movement understood that its founder had left it to deal with larger and more pressing issues facing humankind. In *Analysis Terminable and Interminable* (1937), when Freud once more became interested in clinical psychoanalysis, his tone was more guarded and less optimistic, but wiser.

Everyday experience, however, teaches us that in a normal person any solution of an instinctual conflict only holds good for a particular relation between the strength of the instinct and the strength of the ego. If the strength of the ego diminishes, whether through illness or exhaustion, or from some similar cause, all the instincts which have so far been successfully tamed may renew their demands and strive to obtain substitutive satisfactions in abnormal ways” (pp. 225-226).

Both *The Future of An Illusion* (1927) and *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930) clearly show the impact of the structural point of view on Freud’s thinking. In *The Future of An Illusion* Freud pointed out that “Every individual is virtually an enemy of civilization,” and “Civilization has to be defended against the individual” (p. 6). Civilization in turn rests on a compulsion to work and the renunciation of instinct (p. 10). Due to the formation of the superego the external coercion becomes internalized. Freud derived the religious need for a God from the need of the helpless child for a protective father. Religion is an illusion that failed to make its believers happy. It is the universal, obsessive neurosis of humanity (p. 43). Because Freud believed that humanity would, at some future time, outgrow the need to believe in a God, *The Future of An Illusion* belongs to the Enlightenment period of history. He concludes with a beautiful affirmation.
The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind, but it is in itself a point of no small importance. And from it one can derive yet other hopes (p. 53) . . . Since we are prepared to renounce a good part of our infantile wishes, we can bear it if a few of our expectations turn out to be illusions (p. 54).

Since this book was written we have seen a number of attempts to create societies that are not based on a belief in a God. They resulted in a "cult of personality." Freud’s hopes that humanity would outgrow the need for an omnipotent God have not materialized so far. *Civilization and Its Discontents* opens with a discussion between Freud and Romain Rolland about the latter’s ego-feeling as a basis for religion, which Freud explained in a very interesting way.

. . . originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external world from itself. Our present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive – indeed, an all-embracing – feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it (p.68).

In some people this early all-embracing ego feeling persists side by side with the “more sharply demarcated ego feelings of maturity” (p. 68). For Freud, this persistent feeling of childhood is the basis what Romain Rolland calls “oceanic feeling,” which becomes transformed into religion.

Freud cites a famous statement by Goethe: “He who possesses science and art also has religion; but he who possesses neither of those two, let him have religion!” (footnote, p. 74). Freud concludes ruefully, “One feels inclined to say that the intention that man should be ‘happy’ is not included in the plan of ‘Creation’” (p. 76). Unhappiness and suffering come from three directions: our own body, doomed to decay; from the external world that refuses to grant our wishes; and from our relations to other individuals (p. 72). Freud observed:

The feeling of happiness derived from the satisfaction of a wild instinctual impulse untamed by the ego is incomparably more intense than that derived from sating an instinct that has been tamed (p. 79).
Freud's observations on Communism were politically important. He questioned Communism's basic assumption that humans were wholly good but private property had corrupted their nature. Under this theory, if private property were abolished all hostility would disappear. To Freud this was an illusion. Aggressiveness was not created by property; it was there before property became important. Humans do band together in love, but then their hostility has to be directed towards others. Freud wondered what the Soviets would do after they had wiped out the bourgeoisie (p. 115). (Since these lines were written history has answered the question with the Moscow trials in the 1930s and Stalin's terror). Up to the discovery of the death instinct and the role of aggression psychoanalysis was in alliance with forces operating for social change. With this book the psychoanalytic movement became more conservative.

In many ways the two books, written three years apart, are very similar. They are both based on Freud's new recognition of the role of aggression and the death instinct, but in other ways they are very different. The Future of An Illusion still belongs to the hopeful literature of the Enlightenment, but this cannot be said about the pessimism that dominates Civilization and Its Discontents. The first book ended with the affirmation of the voice of the intellect; the second one ends with:

I have not the courage to rise up before my fellow-men as a prophet, and I bow to their reproach that I can offer them no consolation; for at bottom that is what they are all demanding – the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately than the most virtuous believers (p. 145).

In these two books, taken together, Freud demonstrated that knowledge of psychoanalysis resulted in a definite philosophy of life or, as he preferred to call it, a Weltanschauung. Equally important was that psychoanalysis was no longer confined to a technique of therapy but led to a new understanding of the world we live in.

An interesting attempt to make order in the difficult problem of psychoanalysis was made by Waelder (1962). He offered the following hierarchical structure:

The first task of the analyst when the analysand begins treatment is gathering data of observation. The psychoanalyst learns more facts about the patient than other people have. Because of the special structure of the treatment situation, the analyst hears of events the patient has not shared with anyone else. The therapist learns to know much about the patient's
unconscious wishes, dreams, and childhood memories. These form the level of observation. When this data is interconnected through interpretations, a second level of clinical interpretation is reached. When more abstract generalizations are made, the third level of clinical generalizations is reached. These in turn give rise to theoretical concepts, creating the level of clinical theory. Beyond clinical theory Freud created an even more abstract level of theory that he called the level of metapsychology. In Freud's view metapsychology put psychoanalytic theory on equal footing with physics and other natural sciences.

Waelder then created a further level that he called Freud's philosophy, which is the level of observation and clinical interpretation shared by all psychoanalysts. The level of clinical theory and metapsychology is not as essential as the first two levels. Waelder did not believe that Freud's philosophy was of any significance to psychoanalysis, and believed that therapists with different philosophies could practice psychoanalysis. The degree to which these various layers in psychoanalytic writing are known to the outside world, Waelder thought, are in inverse ratio to their relevance for psychoanalysis. Freud's philosophy is better known than the other levels. Waelder's hierarchy is an attempt to reduce the connection between psychoanalysis and philosophy.

In "Psychoanalysis and Moral Values" (1976), an unfinished paper Waelder was working on at the time of his death in 1967, he gave psychoanalysis three meanings:
1. a scientific study of the human mind
2. a method of therapy
3. a philosophy of life akin to Socratic humanism.

Waelder saw the belief that the enlargement of consciousness as a value by itself, regardless of whether or not it is therapeutic, as an example of the philosophical aspect (Gutman, 1976, pp. 632-634). I find this formulation helpful. Psychoanalysis becomes philosophical when it gives rise to an activity beyond its primary two activities: studying the mind and attempting to become a more effective therapy. Psychoanalysis becomes a philosophy as a result of what it has achieved.

Another psychoanalyst who brought the discipline closer to philosophy was Loewald. In his 1972 paper on internalization he built a metapsychology significantly different from Freud's. Loewald contrasts repression with internalization. Repression is "a state of lower psychic organization." When we bring to consciousness what was repressed, it undergoes better structur-
internal life takes place after the Oedipus complex has been overcome. The post-Oedipal man or woman then develops a point of view unique to her or him and therefore philosophical. Mastery of the Oedipus complex results in a higher level of integration of our personality and makes us more individualized, and as part of that process we develop a philosophy of our own.

For the sake of clarity let me display to you some of the wealth psychoanalysis has accumulated that, in my opinion, can be transformed into philosophy. I am fully aware of the many problems psychoanalysis faces today but right now I want to examine our richness.

Freud's greatest single discovery was the recognition of the existence and power of the unconscious. That this knowledge also enables us to understand mental pathology was the first byproduct. Further observation followed, which made psychoanalysis capable of creating a philosophy of life. These are:

1. What is unique to the human being and differentiates us from the animal world is our prolonged helplessness as children.
2. This helplessness makes us very dependent on our caretakers. Unlike other animals we are not endowed with powerful instincts to survive. As infants, we need the love of adults to foster in us the wish to live. If we do not get this love, we do not thrive and become depressed; the wish to die then becomes powerful. We need to love and be loved to give meaning to our lives, not only in infancy but also throughout the life cycle.
3. The human being is capable of internalization, and after internalization it is easier to tolerate the absence of the love object, usually the mother.
4. Both boys and girls begin their lives with a strong attachment to the mother but before the latency period sets in the girl develops a stronger attachment to the father and hostility to the mother. If we do not obtain the love we need, our aggression will increase. This imbalance may lead to destructive behavior towards others or to suicidal tendencies.
5. Sexuality does not begin with puberty. There is a period of infantile sexuality that culminates in the Oedipus complex, which can take either a positive or a negative form. (The positive Oedipus is the love of the parent of the opposite gender, while the negative Oedipus is love for the parent of the same gender.) Overcoming the impact of the Oedipus complex is life's major task. The happiness of love celebrates the moment when the libido, previously attached to one or both parental figures, has successfully been transferred to the new, non-incestuous love object. The victory over the Oedipus complex is, however, never complete. In prolonged relationships the partner may come to see the
spouse as a return of one of the parents and the Oedipus complex is re-established, requiring a new falling in love to free us from the new Oedipal bondage.

6. The victory of aggression over the libido and the return of the Oedipus complex is not the only danger. There is a threat of the victory of narcissism, or self-love, over the love of the other. Self-love can never offer the satisfaction and happiness that love for another person offers. We need some narcissism to assert ourselves, and many people suffer from narcissistic deficiency, while others have too strong a self-love to be capable of relating to another person.

7. Infantile sexuality is not “genital.” Because of his aggression, the child does not envision the sexuality of the parents as an expression of love but rather as either the father injuring the mother or the mother castrating the father. Under optimal conditions human libido goes through a series of stages. Originally the libido is oral, the leading zone is the mouth, and the pleasure is sucking. On this level aggression finds expression in biting. This period is followed by the anal phase, in which the anus becomes the leading sexual zone. This is followed by the urethral stage, in which urination and the withholding of urination is the center of interest. The next stage is the phallic phase, where the boy develops a castration anxiety and the girl develops penis envy (Jones, 1933). The great miracle of human development takes place between the phallic and the genital phases, when the sexual act is no longer experienced as an act of aggression or a conquest but becomes an act of love. Sexual development may not proceed smoothly and may give rise to a fixation point that prevents further development.

8. Human beings carry within them a degree of bisexuality. Boys wish to be able to bear children (Jacobson, 1950) and girls wish to be boys. When all goes well, the counter-gender wishes undergo sublimation and do not cause sexual or characterological difficulties, but that is not always the case. When these wishes are not sublimated, it results in inner conflict or sexual inhibition (Kubie, 1978; Jacobson, 1950). The capacity to enjoy the sexual experience fully is directly related to our capacity to accept that we are one gender and need the partner of the other gender to feel fulfilled.

9. The importance of trauma. There are dangers coming from the outside world and dangers arising from the malfunctioning of our bodies, and there are also dangers threatening us from the overwhelming forces of the unconscious. External reality can inflict traumas on us, but trauma
can also take place when, in anxiety-dreams or nightmares, thoughts or wishes better off repressed have entered the preconscious and are beyond our ability to bear. Psychoanalytic therapy can help us face what we had to repress, without fully re-experiencing the impact of trauma that originally caused the repression. To various degrees, well-conducted therapy can help us face our unconscious in doses that are not overwhelming. The traumatic events in turn have the power to create a repetition compulsion, in which we repeat what happened to us in one form or another. The conviction that the traumas of childhood need not decide our adult life is not a scientific fact but has the character of a philosophy.

My list is not complete and more could be added, but I hope that enough has been said to convince you how rich psychoanalysis is and to suggest that this wealth can be converted into a philosophy of life beyond the confines of what we traditionally call psychoanalysis.

Following Freud, most psychoanalysts would regard the ten points I have enumerated not as a statement of philosophy but as data of observation. My point is that they also contain a philosophy of life deserving the name philosophy. This claim, in turn, is based on my seeing them as representing a coherent point of view.

To become a philosophy, an intentionality has to be introduced that is most easily applicable to the parent-child relationship. Parents who have adopted psychoanalysis as a philosophy will not take a month’s vacation and leave their one-year-old child under the care of a grandparent. They know that at this age the relationship is just developing and the internalization is not yet strong enough to tolerate a prolonged separation. They will also not take the child into their bed because it has nightmares; they will not appear naked before the child, and the father will not take his daughter to a nudist colony.

The whole area of psychoanalysis as a philosophy of life has not been explored. To give one more example from pathology, in many cases the superego offers no warning before the prohibited act occurs but only punishes the person after the fact. Psychoanalysis as a philosophy demands that the superego function as a warning, not as a punishment.

I also submit for your consideration that it was this implicit philosophy that appealed to the intellectual world in which Freud’s work was read. Our therapeutic successes were not nearly as impressive. I regard it as a loss that Freud opposed the philosophical implications of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is also like philosophy in its aim to free the analysand from unconscious wishes that have led to an inner conflict, to free the analyzed
from burdensome inhibitions, and to help the men and women seeking its help to lead a life with less conflict and to resume personal growth.

Psychoanalysis, unlike any philosophy, has spent much energy examining the first years of life. In my opinion, there are three important events during early childhood that determine the individual's future. The first event is the development of a full symbiotic relationship between mother and infant; the second is the resolution of this symbiosis into a strong separation-individuation phase; the third is the creation as well as the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Falling in love, as I have shown (The Anatomy of Loving, 1987), is a refinding of the symbiotic phase. Successful separation-individuation is necessary to protect us from the fear of being devoured or of being absorbed by another, and derivatives of the Oedipus complex reappear in adult life when the couple increasingly see each other in terms of father and mother roles, thus reintroducing the Oedipal taboo. Both the resurgence of narcissism and the increase in the strength of the aggressive drive are permanent difficulties that have to be overcome. To put these ideas together the way I just have is, in my view, the articulation of a philosophy of life.

We have a world of insights to contribute and, against Freud's wishes, I believe psychoanalysis constitutes a philosophy of life worth expressing. Following Edelman, if we scrutinize psychoanalysis for clarity and consistency, we look at it philosophically. We can look upon psychoanalysis as a philosophy for our time that takes into account the power of the unconscious.

If anyone would ask what phase of the treatment is closest to philosophy, I would say it is termination. It is in this phase that our patient tries to face what was achieved and what has resisted change, what treatment has achieved and what is left to work on. Often the relationships to the spouse, children, parents, and friends have to be evaluated and what may be most painful is what could not be achieved. In this phase, at the end of treatment, terminating patients must look at themselves with a newly-gained objectivity and sometimes even formulate a new philosophy to govern their lives.

References


* Freud, S. (1900). The Interpretation of Dreams. S.E. 4-5.


